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Income Tax-PROPERTY SETTLEMENT IN DIVORCE-AN UNSETTLED
AREA OF SETTLED LAW-Wright v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 377 (1974),
aff'd, 543 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1976).
Wright v. Commissioner' provides an excellent illustration of the
problems which the issue of property settlement in divorce can pres-
ent for even the most practiced attorney. This comment will con-
sider several of the indices used by the courts in federal income tax
litigation to answer this question: When is a "property settlement"
not a property settlement?
William C. Wright (William) sued for divorce from his wife, Jean,
on April 28, 1967. A final judgment was entered on February 2,
1968,2 denying alimony.3 Jean was awarded the personal property
stipulated in a statement of assets and liabilities as belonging to
her, with a total value of $227,752.1 Jean was also awarded $228,000,
to be paid on a fixed schedule within ten and one-half years of
October 4, 1967.1 William retained the balance of the property,
which was stipulated as belonging to him.'
For calendar years 1968, 1969, and 1970, William deducted from
his gross income the payments made on the $228,000 lump sum
award, pursuant to section 215 of the Internal Revenue Code.7 Jean
did not include these payments in her gross income during those
years.8 The Commissioner sent notices of deficiency to both parties.
The Tax Court found that William's partial payments toward the
$228,000 total were deductible by him and taxable to his wife.9 The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."0
Under the relevant code sections, the tax consequences to each of
1. 543 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1976).
2. Wright v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 377, 382 (1974). Following the divorce hearing on
October 4, 1967, Jean's attorney submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
to which William's attorney objected. Id. at 379. After another hearing on December 8, 1967,
the court adopted, with modifications, the proposals of Jean's counsel. Id. at 381. Note that
the divorce was granted on October 4, 1967, and a final judgment was entered some four
months later.
3. Id. at 383.
4. 543 F.2d at 598.
5. 62 T.C. at 384. Jean was also made the owner and beneficiary of a term life insurance
policy. William's right to deduct the premium payments on this policy was also in litigation.
The Tax Court held-and the Seventh Circuit affirmed-that the premiums paid by William
on the policy should not be included in Jean's gross income and, therefore, were not deducti-
ble by William. This complicated issue will not be addressed in this comment.
6. Id. at 385.
7. All references to the Internal Revenue Code are to the Act of 1954, as amended.
8. 62 T.C. at 386.
9. Id. at 395.
10. 543 F.2d at 600.
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the parties in Wright were substantial, depending on whether the
''property settlement" of $228,000 in the case was determined to be
a genuine property settlement or, instead, alimony. According to the
code, if the amounts paid are for a property settlement, the husband
may not take a deduction for them and the wife need not include
them in her income. Conversely, if the amounts paid are considered
alimony, the husband is allowed a deduction and the wife must
include the money in her gross income. The preferences of each
party are clear: the husband prefers to call the payments "alimony"
while the wife prefers a "property settlement."
Section 215 of the Internal Revenue Code allows the husband a
deduction for alimony or support payments which are includible in
the gross income of the wife." Such payments are included in the
wife's gross income if they meet the requirements of section
71(a)(1).'1 Accordingly, such payments must be: (1) periodic pay-
ments made to the wife, (2) after a decree of divorce or legal separa-
tion, (3) in discharge of a legal obligation arising out of the marital
relationship, and (4) imposed on the husband under a divorce or
separation decree, or under a written instrument incident to a di-
vorce or separation.
The Treasury Regulations define the characteristics of "periodic
payments" as either (1) payments made over a period of ten years
11. (a) GENERAL RuLE.-In the case of a husband described in section 71, there
shall be allowed as a deduction amounts includible under section 71 in the gross
income of his wife, payment of which is made within the husband's taxable year.
No deduction shall be allowed under the preceding sentence with respect to any
payment if, by reason of section 71(d) or 682, the amount thereof is not includible
in the husband's gross income.
I.R.C. § 215.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.-As used in sections 71, 152(b)(4), 215 and 682, if the husband
and wife therein referred to are divorced, wherever appropriate to the meaning of
such sections, the term "wife" shall be read "former wife" and the term "husband"
shall be read "former husband"; and, if the payments described in such sections
are made by or on behalf of the wife or former wife to the husband or former
husband instead of vice versa, wherever appropriate to the meaning of such sec-
tions, the terms "husband" shall be read "wife" and the term "wife" shall be read
"husband."
Id. § 7701(a)(17).
12. DECREE OF DIVORCE OR SEPARATE MAINTENANCE.-If a wife is divorced or legally
separated from her husband under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance,
the wife's gross income includes periodic payments, (whether or not made at regular
intervals) received after such decree in discharge of (or attributable to property
transferred, in trust or otherwise, in discharge of) a legal obligation which, because
of the marital or family relationship, is imposed on or incurred by the husband




or more (in which case only that portion of a payment in any one
year which does not exceed ten percent of the entire lump sum
award is considered alimony);"3 or (2) payments made over a period
of less than ten years which are subject to alteration or modification
upon the death of either spouse, remarriage of the wife, or change
in the economic circumstances of either spouse, 4 and are "in the
nature of alimony or an allowance for support."' 5 If these require-
ments are not met, the payments are considered to be in discharge
of an obligation of the principal sum specified in the decree and
thus represent a nontaxable event to the wife.
The judges of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals felt that the
facts in Wright presented a "close and difficult case."' 7 But the
circuit court affirmed the Tax Court's decision that the sum of
$228,000 was alimony and therefore deductible by the husband and
taxable to the wife. The court offered two principal reasons for this
holding.
First, there was no clear indication that any of Jean's property
rights were exchanged for the $228,000.18 Contrary to the finding of
the Tax Court, the circuit court found that if the parties intended
an exchange of property, a finding in support of a property settle-
ment would be justified. 9 Faced with a silent record, the court
looked to the statement of assets and liabilities, which showed the
tangible property of each party as being returned to each-plus an
additional $228,000 to be paid by William to Jean."0 There was no
indication of an exchange.
Second, the court gave great weight to the timing of the payments
as an indication of the intent of the parties. Because the schedule
for making the payments was within the control of the parties at the
time of the divorce negotiations, arrangements could easily have
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(2) (1957).
14. Id. § 1.71-1(d)(3)(i)(a).
15. Id. § 1.71-1(d)(3)(i)(b).
16. IR.C. § 71(c)(1) provides: "GENERAL RULE.-For purposes of subsection (a), install-
ment payments discharging a part of an obligation the principal sum of which is, either in
terms of money or property, specified in the decree, instrument, or agreement shall not be
treated as periodic payments."
17. 543 F.2d at 598.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. As part of the divorce proceedings, William's attorney had prepared a statement of
assets and liabilities. William's assets and liabilities were clearly the result of his personal
efforts. Jean's possessions were just as clearly purchased with funds she had inherited. The
division represented by the statement showed a definite division of property, but the $228,000
was obviously to come from William's resources, and the statement showed no tangible
property for which the sum might be exchanged. 62 T.C. at 385.
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been made to meet the requirements of section 71(c)(1).2 ' If the
payments had been scheduled for completion within ten years, the
court could have found that a principal sum specified in the divorce
decree had been discharged. The amounts would not have been
deductible by William or includible by Jean. Section 71(c)(2) pro-
vides that if the payments in discharge of a principal sum are com-
pleted in more than ten years, such payments will be treated as if
they were periodic payments." That is, the tax consequences
change, and the amounts become deductible by the payor and inclu-
dible by the recipient. In Wright, since the parties decided on a
payment period of ten and one-half years, the court inferred that the
payments were meant to be alimony.
3
Jean's arguments in rebuttal deserve attention because they very
nearly persuaded the Seventh Circuit to rule in her favor. Jean
pointed out that (1) the payments were for a fixed sum, (2) they
were secured, (3) they were not contingent on either her death or her
remarriage, (4) the divorce court adopted the conclusions of law of
her attorney, 4 and (5) alimony was specifically denied in the divorce
decree. Jean contended that the lump sum was payment for her
"inchoate interest in William's property at the time of the divorce
under Wis. Stat. Ann. section 247.26 (1957) ....
21. For the text of § 71(c)(1), see note 16 supra.
22. WHERE PERIOD FOR PAYMENT IS MORE THAN 10 YEARS.-If, by the terms of the
decree, instrument, or agreement, the principal sum referred to in paragraph (1) is
to be paid or may be paid over a period ending more than 10 years from the date
of such decree, instrument, or agreement, then (notwithstanding paragraph (1)) the
installment payments shall be treated as periodic payments for purposes of subsec-
tion (a), but (in the case of any one taxable year of the wife) only to the extent of
10 percent of the principal sum. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the part
of any principal sum which is allocable to a period after the taxable year of the wife
in which it is received shall be treated as an installment payment for the taxable
year in which it is received.
I.R.C. § 71(c)(2).
23. 543 F.2d at 600.
24. The final proposals of Jean's attorney as provided in the divorce judgment were:
Twenty-second. That alimony be and hereby is denied.
Twenty-sixth. (a) That as and for a complete division . . of property of the
parties, the plaintiff be and he hereby shall pay to the defendant the sum of
$228,000.00 within ten and one-half (10 .2) years of October 4, 1967; and payable
on the following terms: No less than $2,000.00 per month be paid by the plaintiff
to the defendant for the first six months; that thereafter the plaintiff shall pay to
the defendant no less than the sum of $1,800.00 per month for the balance of the
term of the payment of the $228,000.00 specified herein.
62 T.C. at 383-84.
25. Id. at 389. The statute provided in part:
Upon every divorce from the bond of matrimony for any cause excepting that of
adultery committed by the wife, and also upon every divorce from bed and board,
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In 1962, the United State Supreme Court held, in United States
v. Davis,6 that inchoate rights "do not even remotely reach the
dignity of co-ownership. The wife has no interest-passive or ac-
tive-over the management or disposition of her husband's personal
property" and "the rights of succession and reasonable share do not
differ significantly from the husband's obligations of support and
alimony." 7 However, as the Supreme Court pointed out four years
earlier in United States v. Bess,2" property rights are created by the
states, not by the federal government. The decision in Davis was
based on Delaware law. It is necessary in each case to look to state
law to determine the extent to which inchoate rights may be prop-
erty rights and so may serve as the basis for a property division at
divorce.
The Wright court ruled that Wisconsin did not accord the wife an
ownership or property interest in her husband's property. Under
section 247.26 of the Wisconsin Statutes, the trial court's duty to
divide property is discretionary, not mandatory." Consequently, the
timing of the installment payments became crucial to the decision.
the court may further adjudge to the wife such alimony out of the estate of the
husband, for her support and maintenance, and such allowance for the support,
maintenance and education of the minor children committed to her care and cus-
tody as it shall deem just and reasonable, and the court may finally decide and
distribute the estate, both real and personal, of the husband and so much of the
estate to the wife as shall have been derived from the husband, between the parties
and divest and transfer the title of any thereof accordingly ....
Act of Aug. 16, 1935, ch. 379, § 1, 1935 Wis. Laws 592 (current version at Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 247.26 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978)) (emphasis added).
26. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
27. Id. at 70. While Davis was concerned with whether and, if so, when a transfer of
appreciated property by a husband to a former wife would be taxable, nevertheless, the
quoted passage has often been cited in support of decisions such as Wright. See DuCanto,
Negotiating and Drafting Property Settlement Agreements in the Reflected Light of Davis
and Lester Cases, 19 DEPAUL L. RFv. 717 (1970).
28. 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1958).
29. For text of statute, see note 25 supra.
Nor does Florida recognize an "inchoate property right" which might form part of a prop-
erty division such as the one attempted in Wright. In Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla.
1950), the inchoate right to dower and the right to alimony were the only property rights the
court recognized as connected with the marriage relationship. Id. at 472 n.2. The Pawley court
held that a divorce decree granted with no consideration of the wife's right to alimony does
not destroy that right. The court found that the inchoate right to dower had "some of the
incidents of property" and was in "the nature of a lien or encumbrance." Id. Such a right,
however, does not survive divorce. In 1950, the right to dower was the only inchoate right
considered to arise from the marriage relationship. The right to alimony, of course, arises from
the dissolution of that relationship. This remained true as late as 1973. Ryan v. Ryan, 277
So. 2d 266, 269 (Fla. 1973). Florida has since abolished the right to dower by statute effective
January 1, 1976, FLA. STAT. § 732.111 (1977), and has substituted the right of the surviving
spouse to an elective share. FLA. STAT. § 732.201 (1977).
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The divorce decree of October 4, 1967, called for payments to be
completed in ten and one-half years, that is, by April 4, 1978. Thus,
for William's payments to qualify as periodic payments, his obliga-
tion to pay must have arisen prior to April 4, 1968.30 Jean argued
that according to section 247.37 of the Wisconsin Statutes, the obli-
gation did not arise until six months later, on October 4, 1968-one
year after the date of the judgment. This statute provided that no
judgment of divorce was effective so far as it affected the status of
the parties "until the expiration of one year from the granting of
such judgment. . .. 3'
Under Wisconsin law, however, a divorce decree is not an interlo-
cutory judgment. It is final as to marital status subject only to the
death of a party or the lapse of the statutory period.32 Further, under
Wisconsin law, the portion of a judgment of divorce relating to
property divisions cannot be changed or vacated by the divorce
court after sixty days from the date of expiration of the term of the
court granting the divorce.3 Since the term of the Circuit Court of
Milwaukee County ended on December 30, 1967, the operative date
was February 29, 1968-still more than two months before April 4,
1968. Moreover, in Seiler v. Seiler, a case directly on point, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court based its holding on the premise that for
purposes of determining whether a payment is periodic, a divorce
is granted when the formal judgment is entered.
34
Clearly William's attorney made a very astute move in choosing
30. See I.R.C. § 71(c)(2), the text of which is set forth in note 22 supra.
31. The statute provided in part:
When a judgment or decree of divorce from the bonds of matrimony is granted so
far as it affects the status of the parties it shall not be effective until the expiration
of one year from the date of the . . . granting of such judgment or decree; except-
ing that it shall immediately bar the parties from cohabitation together and except
that it may be reviewed on appeal during said period. But in case either party dies
within said period, such judgment or decree, unless vacated or reversed, shall be
deemed to have entirely severed the marriage relation immediately before such
death.
Act of May 18, 1931, ch. 117, § 1, 1931 Wis. Laws 239 (current version at Wis. STAT. ANN. §
247.37 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978)). The requisite one-year period following the judgment
has been changed to six months.
32. Rogers v. Hollister, 146 N.W. 488, 490 (Wis. 1914). Florida is faced with neither the
problem of interlocutory decree nor the one year grace period. The court may, upon a showing
that injustice would result, enter a final decree before the 20 days otherwise required since
the filing of the original petition for dissolution of the marriage have elapsed. FLA. STAT. §
61.19 (1977). The only case construing this statute involved the date at which a constructive
trust might be imposed. The court held that a divorce decree was final when it was reduced
to writing and signed by the chancellor. Leitner v. Willaford, 306 So. 2d 555, 557 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1975). The Supreme Court of Florida has not addressed the issue.
33. Anderson v. Anderson, 98 N.W.2d 434, 437 (Wis. 1959).
34. 180 N.W.2d 627, 630 (Wis. 1970).
CASE COMMENTS
a period of ten and one-half years. Even if William's obligation to
pay were found to have arisen, not on the date the divorce was
granted, but sixty days after expiration of the term of the court, the
commencement date of his obligation would then have been Febru-
ary 29, 1968, because after that date provisions regarding property
divisions could not be changed. Of the three possible dates, two were
within the necessary time period. 5 The Seiler decision foreclosed
use of the third. The Seventh Circuit noted that "[h]ad the parties
intended these to be installment. . . rather than periodic payments
. . . they could easily have provided that the. . . $228,000 must be
paid within ten years."3
The Seventh Circuit distinguished two of its previous decisions
upon which Jean relied. These decisions further illustrate judicial
approaches to the problem of property settlement.
In Van Orman v. Commissioner,37 F. Harold Van Orman and Rae
Van Orman were granted a divorce and executed a "Property Settle-
ment Agreement" on April 28, 1960. The agreement contained sepa-
rate sections providing for child support, alimony, and the purchase
of a new home for Rae. 8 The husband deducted the mortgage pay-
ments and insurance on the house, but the Commissioner disal-
lowed the deductions. The Tax Court held-and the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed-that the payments were installment payments under
section 71(c)(1).1 No contingencies were involved, for neither the
death nor the remarriage of Rae would have affected her former
husband's obligation to purchase the house and deliver a free and
clear title to Rae within ten years.4° Moreover, the title was to re-
main in his name until that time. The Tax Court noted with appar-
ent disapproval that the husband "passes lightly over the fact that
the title to the house is in his name by saying that he merely 'held
this title as trustee."' l Both courts pointed out as well that separate
35. Both October 4, 1967 (the date the divorce decree was granted) and February 29, 1968
(the date 60 days after expiration of the term of the court granting the divorce) came before
April 4, 1968 (the date 10 years before the final payment was due). Only if the court found
that the divorce did not become final until October 4, 1968, would the payments have been
made in less than 10 years.
36. 543 F.2d at 598. For another case in which the date of the beginning of the payment
period was crucial, see Joslin v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 231 (1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 1223 (7th
Cir. 1970).
37. 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1440 (1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1969).
38. 27 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1441. Section 16 of the agreement provided as follows: "16. The
purchase of a new house for defendant [Rae] and the delivery of title thereto shall not be
affected by the remarriage of the defendant. The plaintiff [F. Harold] is to have the right
to all rentals in event she does not occupy the house." Id.
39. 418 F.2d at 172.
40. Id.
41. 27 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1442.
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sections in the agreement pertained to child support and alimony.,
The Seventh Circuit concluded that "[iut is apparent the purchase
of the new home was in satisfaction of some property right and not
a periodic support payment.
'43
In Houston v. Commissioner,4" Robert Houston and his wife Mary
entered into a stipulation which was incorporated into a divorce
decree on October 10, 1959. Subparagraphs 2(a)-(d) of the stipula-
tion provided that within a month after the divorce, ownership of
the following items would vest in the wife: (1) a house worth $40,000;
(2) personal property worth $20,900; (3) insurance policies with a
cash surrender value of $29,799.44; and (4) $115,000 in cash. Sub-
paragraph 2(e) called for an additional $300,000 to be paid in equal
installments over twelve years, with the first payment to be made
one year after the last day of the month following the granting of
the divorce.4"
For the 1959 tax year, Robert Houston deducted $50,569.94, which
he represented as being ten percent of thirteen periodic alimony
payments." The Commissioner disallowed all but a very small
amount for temporary alimony.47 The Tax Court found that the
realty, personalty, insurance policies, and cash transferred in 1959
were, because of the nature and amount of the assets, "suggestive
of a property settlement rather than the discharge of a recurrent,
periodic obligation." The Tax Court also noted that the 1959 trans-
fer was to take place within two months of the divorce-a transfer
the court characterized as "in the nature of a distribution of assets,
in contradistinction to the support characteristics of the annual
payments" of $25,000 for twelve years.49
It is interesting to note that on appeal to the Seventh Circuit,
Robert Houston offered an argument mentioned by the Tax Court
in a footnote.' While conceding that the house, personal property,
42. 418 F.2d at 171; 27 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1442.
43. 418 F.2d at 171. The property right mentioned was not otherwise characterized by the
court. The Tax Court concluded that "[elach step in his [Harold's] argument is based on
a completely fantastic, illogical interpretation of the contract. Respondent [IRS] was right
in disallowing the deductions." 27 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1443.
44. 52 T.C. 815 (1969), aff'd, 442 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1971).
45. 52 T.C. at 816-17.
46. 442 F.2d at 41. (The house, personal property, and insurance policies total $90,699.44.
Adding the cash [$115,000 plus $300,000], the total becomes $505,699.44.)
47. Id.
48. 52 T.C. at 818 (footnote omitted).
49. Id.
50. Id. n.3: "While a portion of the cash transferred in 1959 might have been treated in
the stipulation as a 13th periodic payment, such treatment was not given, and Houston has
made no argument that it would be appropriate to extend periodic-payment treatment to a
portion of the sum transferred."
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and insurance policies constituted a property transfer, Houston
maintained that the $115,000 cash should be treated as the first of
thirteen annual installments. 51 The court of appeals agreed with the
Tax Court's statement that "Houston's asserted characterization of
the transaction is simply an attempt to camouflage its true signifi-
cance when viewed in terms of the framework set forth in the settle-
ment stipulation. '"2
The other circuit courts of appeals have faced similar problems.
In the Third Circuit, Fox v. United States 3 dealt with a divorce-
related property settlement agreement. Though the particular sec-
tion of the Internal Revenue Code under which deductions were
claimed was not the same as in Wright,54 the court's determination
nevertheless hinged on whether or not the $1,000,000 at issue met
the requirements of section 71(c)(1) so as to qualify as installment
payments and thus be nondeductible. As in Wright, the Fox court
found clear intent to meet the requirements of section 71(c)(1). 5
Specifically, the principal sum was contingent upon the divorce,
and payments were to be made in installments over nine and one-
half years.5"
In the Tenth Circuit, Wiles v. Commissioner57 raised the question
of the inchoate rights of a wife in her husband's property. Following
Davis,5 the Wiles court resolved the issue on the basis of Kansas
law, to the effect that the wife was not a co-owner and hence the
"property division" was a taxable event.59 The Wiles court also
noted the disparities in application of federal tax law to transactions
in other states within the Tenth Circuit. 0
In conclusion, then, the attorney involved in divorce negotiations
should remember that the courts consider the intent of the parties
to be crucial.6' All the facts and circumstances of the particular case
51. 442 F.2d at 41.
52. Id. at 42; 52 T.C. at 819.
53. 510 F.2d 1330 (3d Cir. 1975).
54. Fox involved § 483, regarding imputed interest.
55. "The Fox agreement appears to have been written with one eye on the typewriter and
the other on the Internal Revenue Code." 510 F.2d 1334.
56. Id.
57. 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974).
58. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
59. 499 F.2d at 258.
60. See, e.g., Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975), affg 375 F. Supp. 1102
(D. Colo. 1973); Collins v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir.) (Okla.), vacated &
remanded, 393 U.S. 215 (1968), on remand, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969); Pulliam v. Commis-
sioner, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.) (Colo.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836 (1964). See also Wallace v.
United States, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1971). These decisions may usefully be consulted on
the issue of the wife's property rights arising out of the marital relationship.
61. See, e.g., Wright v. Commissioner, 543 F.2d at 598.
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will be considered in determining whether payments are being made
in discharge of a support obligation or as a transfer of property. The
label given to any agreement between the parties will not be disposi-
tive.62
Factors indicating that a property division is intended are: (1) no
mention of alimony during the proceedings or alimony provided
separately; (2) a state statute clearly vesting the wife with rights in
her husband's property; (3) a statement of assets and liabilities of
the parties showing an approximately equal distribution of property
to each party; (4) some indication that payments are not to termi-
nate on the death or remarriage of the wife; and (5) a lump sum
payable shortly after the divorce decree is granted.
Factors indicating that alimony is intended are: (1) mention of
alimony during the proceedings or a statement that a property divi-
sion is "in lieu of alimony"; (2) a state statute either giving the wife
no rights in her husband's property or allowing the court at its
discretion to vest the wife with such rights; (3) a statement of assets
and liabilities showing all the wife's property returned to her, plus
an amount from the husband's property; (4) some indication that
payments are to terminate on the death or remarriage of the wife;
and (5) payments made over either a specified or indeterminate
period.
Property settlements in divorce have significant federal income
tax consequences. The cautious attorney will keep this in mind as
negotiations proceed. Regardless of the emotional situation, the at-
torneys for both parties should attempt to work out a clear settle-
ment to avoid litigation. The tax consequences to each party should
be thoroughly explored. The attorneys should be certain that the
husband and the wife understand what their tax obligations will be
once the divorce is final. If a property division is contemplated, a
clear statement to that effect is crucial. No such statement was
made in Wright, and, based on the statement of assets and liabili-
ties and on the timing of the payments, the court held that alimony
was intended by the parties to the agreement.
62. Ryker v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 924, 929 (1960). Compare with Commissioner v.
Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961), regarding child support payments:
[lif there is to be certainty in the tax consequences of such agreements
[settlement agreements pursuant to divorce] the allocations to child support made
therein must be 'specifically designated' and not left to determination by inference
or conjecture. We believe that the Congress has so demanded in § 22(k) [now §
71]. After all, the parties may for tax purposes act as their best interests dictate,
provided, as that section requires, their action be clear and specific. Certainly the
Congress has required no more and expects no less.
Id. at 306.
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Clarity is essential. But clarity is impossible unless the parties
have reached an agreement based on an understanding of the conse-
quences of their actions. Responsibility for achieving a clear agree-
ment rests with the attorneys. An attorney has not acted in the best
interests of his client if further litigation becomes necessary because
of a poorly drafted divorce settlement.
RUTH L. GOKEL

